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Abstract 
 
 We examine the relationship between the definition of license fee and a possibility of 
negative royalty in a duopoly with an outside innovator which has an option to enter the 
market and imposes a combination of a royalty per output and a fixed fee under general 
demand and cost functions. We consider two scenarios about determination of license fee. 
One is a scenario which does not assume entry of the innovator, and the other is a scenario 
which takes a possibility of entry of the innovator into the market. We will show that the 
optimal royalty rate for the innovator in the former case is smaller than that in the latter 
case, and the sign of the optimal royalty rate depends on whether the goods of firms are 
strategic substitutes or strategic complements.  
 
1  Introduction 
 
Liao and Sen (2005) analyzed a problem of licensing by a combination of a royalty per 
output and a fixed fee under oligopoly with an outside or an incumbent innovator. 
Assuming linear demand and cost functions, they showed that when there are one licensee 
and one non-licensee, the innovator imposes a negative royalty with a positive fixed fee on 
the licensee. Similarly to the definition of license fee in Kamien and Tauman (1986), they 
defined the total license fee in the outside innovator case by the difference between the 
profit of the licensee when it buys the license and its profit when it does not buy the license 
and the other incumbent firm (non-licensee) buys the license. However, if the outside 
innovator has an option to sell a license to the other incumbent firm and, at the same time, 
enter the market when the potential licensee refuses to buy the license, we should use a 
different definition of license fee. In this paper we consider two scenarios about the license 
fee.   
 Scenario 1: If the potential licensee refuses the payment of license fee, the other 
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incumbent firm buys the license and the innovator does not enter the market. Then, the 
willingness to pay of the licensee is the difference between its profit as a licensee and the 
profit of a non-licensee. It is the definition used in Liao and Sen (2005).  
 Scenario 2: If the potential licensee refuses the payment of license fee, the other 
incumbent firm buys the license and, at the same time, the innovator enters the market. It 
may be more severe punishment than selling the license to the other firm without entering 
the market. The willingness to pay of the licensee is the difference between its profit as a 
licensee and its profit when the innovator enters the market with a license to the other 
incumbent firm. 
 
We consider a model of an oligopoly in which firms produce substitutable goods under 
general demand and cost functions3, and the innovator has a new cost reducing technology 
which can commonly used by all firms. We will show the following results. 
  
 1.  The optimal royalty rate in Scenario 1 is smaller than that in Scenario 2.  
 2.  If the goods of the firms are strategic substitutes, the optimal royalty rates in Scenario 
1 and Scenario 2 are negative.  
 3.  If the goods of the firms are strategic complements, the optimal royalty rate in 
Scenario 1 may be positive or negative, but that in Scenario 2 is positive.  
 4.  When the non-licensee drops out of the market at the optimal royalty rate, Scenario 1 
and Scenario 2 are equivalent.  
 
We consider only the outside innovator case. In the incumbent innovator case there is no 
problem of definition of license fee because in that case the innovator does not have an 
option whether its enters market or not. 
Also in this paper we analyse only a problem of a possibility of negative royalty with one 
licensee and one non-license. For an outside innovator with two potential licensees whether 
it sells a license to one firm, or sells licenses to two firms is an important problem. We will 
study such a problem in the future research, 
 
2  The model 
 
There are three firms. One outside innovator and two incumbent firms. The innovator has 
a superior cost reducing technology which can commonly used by all firms, and licenses its 
technology to the licensee. Another incumbent firm is the non-licensee. The licensee is 
called Firm A, the non-licensee is called Firm B and the innovator is called Firm I. Firm I is 
an outside innovator at present. But it may enter the market if Firm A refuses to buy the 
license. Therefore, we consider a possibility of entry of Firm I so as to determine the 
license fee imposed on Firm A. Firm I does not really enter the market. 
Denote the outputs of Firms A and B by ݔ஺ and ݔ஻. The output of Firm I when it enters is ݔூ. The firms produce substitutable goods. The prices of the goods of Firms I, A and B 
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are ݌ூ, ݌஺, ݌஻ , and the inverse demand functions are written as ݌஺ሺݔ஺, ݔ஻ሻ  and ݌஻ሺݔ஺, ݔ஻ሻ, or ݌ூሺݔூ, ݔ஺, ݔ஻ሻ, ݌஺ሺݔூ, ݔ஺, ݔ஻ሻ and ݌஻ሺݔூ, ݔ஺, ݔ஻ሻ. We assume that all partial derivatives of the inverse demand functions are negative. They are twice differentiable. The 
cost function of Firm A with a license of the new technology is ܿ஺ሺݔ஺ሻ. The cost function of Firm B is ܿ஻ሺݔ஻ሻ, and the cost function of Firm I when it enters is written as ܿ஺ሺݔூሻ. They are increasing and twice differentiable. We assume ܿ஺ሺݔ஺ሻ ൏ ܿ஻ሺݔ஻ሻ and ܿ′஺ሺݔ஺ሻ ൏ܿ′஻ሺݔ஻ሻ for ݔ஺ ൌ ݔ஻. Firm I imposes a royalty per output and a fixed fee on Firm A. Denote the royalty rate by ݎ. 
The profit of Firm A net of the royalty and the profit of Firm B are written as  
 ߨ஺ ൌ ݌஺ݔ஺ െ ܿ஺ሺݔ஺ሻ െ ݎݔ஺, and  
 ߨ஻ ൌ ݌஻ݔ஻ െ ܿ஻ሺݔ஻ሻ. To determine the total license fee we consider two scenarios.   
 Scenario 1: The innovator does not enter the market. According to auction policy by the 
innovator in Liao and Sen (2005), if Firm A refuses the payment of license fee, Firm B 
buys the license, and the willingness to pay of Firm A is the difference between its profit as 
a licensee and the profit of a non-licensee, that is, ߨ஺ െ ߨ஻. Let ܮ be the fixed license fee. Then,  
 ܮ ൌ ߨ஺ െ ߨ஻. The payoff of the innovator is the sum of the royalty and the fixed license fee. We denote it 
by  
 ߮ଵ ൌ ܮ ൅ ݎݔ஺ ൌ ݌஺ݔ஺ െ ܿ஺ሺݔ஺ሻ െ ሺ݌஻ݔ஻ െ ܿ஻ሺݔ஻ሻሻ.  
 Scenario 2: The innovator has an option to enter the market when Firm A refuses to buy a 
license. Then, Firm B buys the license and at the same time Firm I enters the market. Firm 
A must pay the difference between its profit as a licensee when Firm I does not enter and its 
profit when Firm I enters the market with a license to Firm B. The fixed license fee, ܮ, is 
given by  
 ܮ ൌ ߨ஺ െ ߨ஺௘. ߨ஺௘ denotes the profit of Firm A when Firm I enters the market and Firm B buys the license. Then, Firm A is a non-licensee. Concise description of the equilibrium in that case is 
included in Appendix. 
We denote the payoff of the innovator in this case by  
 ߮ଶ ൌ ܮ ൅ ݎݔ஺ ൌ ݌஺ݔ஺ െ ܿ஺ሺݔ஺ሻ െ ߨ஺௘. Note that ߨ஺௘ is constant, that is, it does not depend on the royalty rate when Firm I does not enter because the optimal royalty rate when Firm I enters the market is different from 
(and independent of) that when it does enter. On the other hand ߨ஻ in ߮ଵ is not constant. It depends on the optimal royalty rate without entry of Firm I. 
 
Severity and credibility of punishment 
 
If ߨ஺௘ ൏ ߨ஻, entry of Firm I with a license to Firm B is more severe punishment for Firm A than a license to Firm B without entry of Firm I when it does not buy the license. ߨ஻ is 
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the profit of a non-licensee in a duopoly. On the other hand, ߨ஺௘  is the profit of a non-licensee in an oligopoly with three firms in which two firms, Firm I and B, use the new 
technology. Thus, we can think that ߨ஺௘ is usually smaller than ߨ஻  When ߨ஺௘ ൏ ߨ஻, we have ߮ଶ ൐ ߮ଵ, and Scenario 2 is more profitable than Scenario 1 for Firm I. However, its entry is not necessarily a credible threat. The payoff of Firm I when it 
enters the market with a license to Firm B is the sum of its profit as a firm in an oligopoly 
and the licensee fee imposed on Firm B. If it is larger than ߮ଵ, entry into the market is a credible threat. 
 
We assume that the output of Firm B, ݔ஻, is positive when the royalty rate is zero. However, if the innovator imposes a negative royalty on Firm A, ݔ஻ may be zero. We consider two cases about demand functions. A case where the goods are strategic 
substitutes and a case where the goods are strategic complements. Also we consider two 
cases about the innovation. The first is a case where the non-licensee continues to operate 
when a negative royalty is imposed on the licensee, and the second is a case where the 
non-licensee drops out of the market with the optimal royalty rate. In the former case the 
innovation is non-drastic, and in the latter case it is drastic. 
We will show that in the case where the non-licensee drops out of the market, Scenario 1 
and Scenario 2 are equivalent. 
 
3  The results 
 
3.1  Firm behavior 
 
The first order conditions for profit maximization of Firm A and Firm B are  
 ݌஺ ൅ ப௣ಲப௫ಲ ݔ஺ െ ܿ′஺ሺݔ஺ሻ െ ݎ ൌ 0, (1) and  
 ݌஻ ൅ ப௣ಳப௫ಳ ݔ஻ െ ܿ′஻ሺݔ஻ሻ ൌ 0. (2) The second order conditions are  
 2 ப௣ಲப௫ಲ ൅
பమ௣ಲ
ப௫ಲమ
ݔ஺ െ ܿ′′஺ሺݔ஺ሻ ൏ 0, 
and  
 2 ப௣ಳப௫ಳ ൅
பమ௣ಳ
ப௫ಳమ
ݔ஻ െ ܿ′′஻ሺݔ஻ሻ ൏ 0. 
Differentiating (1) and (2) with respect to ݎ yields  
 ቀ2 ப௣ಲப௫ಲ ൅
பమ௣ಲ
ப௫ಲమ
ݔ஺ െ ܿ′′஺ሺݔ஺ሻቁ ௗ௫ಲௗ௥ ൅ ቀ
ப௣ಲ
ப௫ಳ ൅
பమ௣ಲ
ப௫ಲ௫ಳ ݔ஺ቁ
ௗ௫ಳ
ௗ௥ ൌ 1, 
and  
 ቀப௣ಳப௫ಲ ൅
பమ௣ಳ
ப௫ಲ௫ಳ ݔ஻ቁ
ௗ௫ಲ
ௗ௥ ൅ ቀ2
ப௣ಳ
ப௫ಳ ൅
பమ௣ಳ
ப௫ಳమ
ݔ஻ െ ܿ′′஻ሺݔ஻ሻቁ ௗ௫ಳௗ௥ ൌ 0. 
From them we obtain  
‐ 5 ‐ 
 
 ௗ௫ಲௗ௥ ൌ
ଶಢమ೛ಳಢೣಳమ ା
ಢమ೛ಳ
ಢೣಳమ
௫ಳି௖ᇱᇱಳሺ௫ಳሻ
୼ , and  
 ௗ௫ಳௗ௥ ൌ െ
ಢ೛ಳ
ಢೣಲା
ಢమ೛ಳ
ಢೣಲೣಳ୶ಳ
୼ , where  
 Δ ൌ ቀ2 பమ௣ಳப௫ಳమ ൅
பమ௣ಳ
ப௫ಳమ
ݔ஻ െ ܿ′′஻ሺݔ஻ሻቁ ቀ2 ப௣ಲப௫ಲ ൅
பమ௣ಲ
ப௫ಲమ
ݔ஺ െ ܿ′′஺ሺݔ஺ሻቁ 
 െቀப௣ಳப௫ಲ ൅
பమ௣ಳ
ப௫ಲ௫ಳ ݔ஻ቁ ቀ
ப௣ಲ
ப௫ಳ ൅
பమ௣ಲ
ப௫ಲ௫ಳ ݔ஺ቁ. We assume  
 Δ ൐ 0. 
Also we assume  
 ฬ2 ப௣ಲப௫ಲ ൅
பమ௣ಲ
ப௫ಲమ
ݔ஺ െ ܿ′′஺ሺݔ஺ሻฬ ൐ ቚப௣ಲப௫ಳ ൅
பమ௣ಲ
ப௫ಲ௫ಳ ݔ஺ቚ, and  
 ฬ2 ப௣ಳப௫ಳ ൅
பమ௣ಳ
ப௫ಳమ
ݔ஻ െ ܿ′′஻ሺݔ஻ሻฬ ൐ ቚப௣ಳப௫ಲ ൅
பమ௣ಳ
ப௫ಲ௫ಳ ݔ஻ቚ. These assumptions are derived from the stability conditions for duopoly (see Seade (1980) 
and Dixit (1986)). We get  
 ௗ௫ಲௗ௥ ൏ 0, and  
 ቚௗ௫ಲௗ௥ ቚ ൐ ቚ
ௗ௫ಳ
ௗ௥ ቚ. 
The goods of the firms are strategic substitutes when ப௣ಳப௫ಲ ൅
பమ௣ಳ
ப௫ಲ௫ಳ ݔ஻ ൏ 0 and strategic 
complements when ப௣ಳப௫ಲ ൅
பమ௣ಳ
ப௫ಲ௫ಳ ݔ஻ ൐ 0. Then,   
 1.  When the goods of the firms are strategic substitutes, ௗ௫ాௗ௥ ൐ 0.  
 2.  When the goods of the firms are strategic complements, ௗ௫ಳௗ௥ ൏ 0.   
3.2  Comparison of two scenarios 
 
Suppose that Firm B does not drop out of the market. 
 
Scenario 1: The innovator does not enter the market. 
 
The condition for maximization of ߮ଵ with respect to ݎ is  ݀߮ଵ
݀ݎ ൌ ൬݌஺ ൅
∂݌஺
∂ݔ஺ ݔ஺ െ ܿ′஺ሺݔ஺ሻ െ
∂݌஻
∂ݔ஺ ݔ஻൰
݀ݔ஺
݀ݎ െ ൬݌஻ ൅
∂݌஻
∂ݔ஻ ݔ஻ െ ܿ′஻ሺݔ஻ሻ െ
∂݌஺
∂ݔ஻ ݔ஺൰
݀ݔ஻
݀ݎ  
ൌ ቀݎ െ ப௣ಳப௫ಲ ݔ஻ቁ
ௗ௫ಲ
ௗ௥ ൅
ப௣ಲ
ப௫ಳ ݔ஺
ௗ௫ಳ
ௗ௥ ൌ 0. (3) 
We get the optimal royalty rate for the innovator as follows.  
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 ̃ݎଵ ൌ ଵ೏ೣಲ
೏ೝ
ቀப௣ಳப௫ಲ ݔ஻
ௗ௫ಲ
ௗ௥ െ
ப௣ಲ
ப௫ಳ ݔ஺
ௗ௫ಳ
ௗ௥ ቁ. (4) 
 
Scenario 2: The innovator enters the market when Firm A refuses to buy a license. 
 
The condition for maximization of ߮ଶ with respect to ݎ is  
 ௗఝమௗ௥ ൌ ቀ݌஺ ൅
ப௣ಲ
ப௫ಲ ݔ஺ െ ܿ′஺ሺݔ஺ሻቁ
ௗ௫ಲ
ௗ௥ ൅
ப௣ಲ
ப௫ಳ ݔ஺
ௗ௫ಳ
ௗ௥ ൌ ݎ
ௗ௫ಲ
ௗ௥ ൅
ப௣ಲ
ப௫ಳ ݔ஺
ௗ௫ಳ
ௗ௥ ൌ 0. (5) 
 Then, we get the optimal royalty rate for the innovator as follows.  
 ̃ݎଶ ൌ െ ଵ೏ೣಲ
೏ೝ
ௗ௫ಳ
ௗ௥
ப௣ಲ
ப௫ಳ ݔ஺. (6) 
 
Suppose that ̃ݎଵ ൌ ̃ݎଶ and (5) is satisfied. ௗ௫ಲௗ௥  and 
ப௣ಲ
ப௫ಳ ݔ஺
ௗ௫ಳ
ௗ௥  in (3) and those in (5) are 
equal. Thus, we have  
 ௗఝభௗ௥ ൌ െ
ப௣ಳ
ப௫ಲ ݔ஻
ௗ௫ಲ
ௗ௥ ൏ 0. 
Therefore, ̃ݎଵ ൏ ̃ݎଶ. We have shown   
Proposition 1 The optimal royalty rate in Scenario 1 is smaller than that in Scenario 2.  
 
 From (4) and (6) we can show the following result.  
 
Proposition 2 Suppose that Firm B does not drop out of the market.   
 1.  If the goods of the firms are strategic substitutes, the optimal royalty rates in Scenario 
1 and Scenario 2 are negative.  
 2.  If the goods of the firms are strategic complements, the optimal royalty rate in 
Scenario 1 may be positive or negative, but that in Scenario 2 is positive.  
 
Proof.   
 1.  If the goods of the firms are strategic substitutes, we have ௗ௫ಳௗ௥ ൐ 0. Then, ̃ݎଵ ൏ 0 
because ௗ௫ಲௗ௥ ൏ 0. Also we have ̃ݎଶ ൏ 0.  
 2.  If the goods of the firms are strategic complements, ௗ௫ಳௗ௥ ൏ 0. Then, we have ̃ݎଵ ൐ 0 
or ̃ݎଵ ൏ 0 depending on ப௣ಳப௫ಲ ݔ஻
ௗ௫ಲ
ௗ௥ െ
ப௣ಲ
ப௫ಳ ݔ஺
ௗ௫ಳ
ௗ௥ ൏ 0 or 
ப௣ಳ
ப௫ಲ ݔ஻
ௗ௫ಲ
ௗ௥ െ
ப௣ಲ
ப௫ಳ ݔ஺
ௗ௫ಳ
ௗ௥ ൐ 0. On 
the other hand, ௗ௫ಳௗ௥ ൏ 0 means ̃ݎଶ ൐ 0.   If  ݔ୆ is sufficiently smaller than ݔ୅ although Firm B does not drop out, it is likely that  ப௣ಳ
ப௫ಲ ݔ஻
ௗ௫ಲ
ௗ௥ െ
ப௣ಲ
ப௫ಳ ݔ஺
ௗ௫ಳ
ௗ௥ ൏ 0 and  ̃ݎଵ ൐ 0. 
  
  
A case where Firm B drops out 
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Suppose that at some royalty rate Firm B drops out of the market. Then, in Scenario 1 we 
have  
 ௗఝభௗ௥ ቚ௫ಳୀ଴ ൌ ݎ
ௗ௫ಲ
ௗ௥ ൅
ப௣ಲ
ப௫ಳ ݔ஺
ௗ௫ಳ
ௗ௥ . 
From (5) also in Scenario 2 we get the same relation. Thus, when Firm B drops out of the 
market, Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 are equivalent, and we obtain the following result. 
 
Proposition 3 In the case where Firm B drops out of the market we obtain the following 
results.   
 1.  If the goods of the firms are strategic substitutes, the optimal royalty rate is negative.  
 2.  If the goods of the firms are strategic complements, the optimal royalty rate is 
positive.  
 
Proof.   
 1.  If  
 ௗఝௗ௥ቚ௫ಳୀ଴ ൌ ݎ
ௗ௫ಲ
ௗ௥ ൅
ப௣ಲ
ப௫ಳ ݔ஺
ௗ௫ಳ
ௗ௥ ൐ 0. 
 Then, ݔ஻ ൐ 0 at the optimal state for the innovator and we have the case in the previous proposition. 
On the other hand, if ௗఝௗ௥ ൑ 0 when ݔ஻ ൌ 0, then the licensee is a monopolist and the optimal royalty rate for the innovator is one such that ݔ஻ ൌ 0. It is negative because 
ݔ஻ ൐ 0 with zero royalty and ௗ௫ಳௗ௥ ൐ 0.  
 2.  If ௗఝௗ௥ ൏ 0 at ݔ஻ ൌ 0, then ݔ஻ ൐ 0 at the optimal state for the innovator and we have the case in the previous proposition. 
On the other hand, if ௗఝௗ௥ ൒ 0 at ݔ஻ ൌ 0, then the licensee is a monopolist and the optimal royalty rate for the innovator is one such that ݔ஻ ൌ 0. It is positive because 
ݔ஻ ൐ 0 with zero royalty and ௗ௫ಳௗ௥ ൏ 0.  
Example 
 
Now let us consider an example. The inverse demand functions are  
݌஺ ൌ ܽ െ ݔ஺ െ ݇ݔ஻, and 
		݌஻ ൌ ܽ െ ݔ஻ െ ݇ݔ஺, where 0 ൏ ݇ ൏ 1. The cost functions of Firm A and Firm B after adoption of the new 
technology by Firm A are, respectively, ሺܿ െ ߝሻݔ஺  and ܿݔ஻ . ܿ  and ߝ  are positive constants such that ܿ ൐ ߝ. Suppose that both firms produce. Then,  
ݔ஺ ൌ ሺ2 െ ݇ሻሺܽ െ ܿሻ െ 2ݎ ൅ 2ߝሺ2 െ ݇ሻሺ2 ൅ ݇ሻ ,	 
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and 
	ݔ஻ ൌ ሺ2 െ ݇ሻሺܽ െ ܿሻ ൅ ݇ݎ െ ߝ݇ሺ2 െ ݇ሻሺ2 ൅ ݇ሻ . 
From them we have  
݀ݔ஺
݀ݎ ൌ െ
2
ሺ2 െ ݇ሻሺ2 ൅ ݇ሻ, 
and 
	݀ݔ஻݀ݎ ൌ
݇
ሺ2 െ ݇ሻሺ2 ൅ ݇ሻ. 
From (4) and (6) the optimal royalty rate in Scenario 1 and that in Scenario 2 are  
 ̃ݎଵ ൌ െ ௞ሺ௔ି௖ሻଶ ൏ 0, and  
 ̃ݎଶ ൌ െ ሺ௔ି௖ሻ௞
యାଶሺ௔ାఌି௖ሻ௞మ
ସሺଶି௞మሻ ൏ 0. 
 
4  Concluding Remark 
 
We have examined the relationship between the definition of license fee and a possibility 
of negative royalty in an oligopoly with an outside innovator which has an option to enter 
the market and imposes a combination of a royalty per output and a fixed fee under general 
demand and cost functions. 
In the future research we want to extend the analysis in this paper to more general 
oligopolistic situation with more than three firms. 
 
Appendix: Main points of a case where the innovator enters the market 
with a license to Firm B. 
 
Suppose that Firm A refuses to buy the license, and Firm I enters the market with a license 
to Firm B. Then, Firm B uses the new technology, and Firm A uses the old technology. 
Denote the output and the profit of the innovator by ݔூ and ߨூ. The profits of the firms are   ߨூ ൌ ݌ூݔூ െ ஺ܿሺݔூሻ,  
 ߨ஻ ൌ ݌஻ݔ஻ െ ܿ஺ሺݔ஻ሻ െ ݎݔ஻, and  
 ߨ஺ ൌ ݌஺ݔ஺ െ ܿ஻ሺݔ஺ሻ. In this case Firm B pays the license fee. The first order conditions for profit maximization 
of Firms I, A and B are  
 ݌ூ ൅ ப௣಺ப௫಺ ݔூ െ ܿ′஺ሺݔூሻ ൌ 0, (7)   
 ݌஻ ൅ ப௣ಳப௫ಳ ݔ஻ െ ܿ′஺ሺݔ஻ሻ െ ݎ ൌ 0, (8)   
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 ݌஺ ൅ ப௣ಲப௫ಲ ݔ஺ െ ܿ′஻ሺݔ஺ሻ ൌ 0. (9) The second order conditions are  
 2 ப௣಺ப௫಺ ൅
பమ௣಺
ப௫಺మ
ݔூ െ ܿ′′஺ሺݔூሻ ൏ 0, 
 
 2 ப௣ಳப௫ಳ ൅
பమ௣ಳ
ப௫ಳమ
ݔ஻ െ ܿ′′஺ሺݔ஻ሻ ൏ 0, 
and  
 2 ப௣ಲப௫ಲ ൅
பమ௣ಲ
ப௫ಲమ
ݔ஺ െ ܿ′′஻ሺݔ஺ሻ ൏ 0. 
 
Differentiating (7), (8) and (9) with respect to ݎ yields  
 ߣூ ௗ௫಺ௗ௥ ൅ ߪூ஻
ௗ௫ಳ
ௗ௥ ൅ ߪூ஺
ௗ௫ಲ
ௗ௥ ൌ 0,  
 ߪ஻ூ ௗ௫಺ௗ௥ ൅ ߣ஻
ௗ௫ಳ
ௗ௥ ൅ ߪ஻஺
ௗ௫ಲ
ௗ௥ ൌ 1, and  
 ߪ஺ூ ௗ௫಺ௗ௥ ൅ ߪ஺஻
ௗ௫ಳ
ௗ௥ ൅ ߣ஺
ௗ௫ಲ
ௗ௥ ൌ 0. From them we obtain  
 ௗ௫಺ௗ௥ ൌ െ
ఒಲఙ಺ಳିఙಲಳఙ಺ಲ
୻ ,  
 ௗ௫ಳௗ௥ ൌ
ఒಲఒ಺ିఙಲ಺ఙ಺ಲ
୻ ,  
 ௗ௫ಲௗ௥ ൌ െ
ఙಲಳఒ಺ିఙಲ಺ఙ಺ಳ
୻ , where  
 Γ ൌ ߣூߣ஻ߣ஺ െ ߣூߪ஻஺ߪ஺஻ െ ߣ஻ߪூ஺ߪ஺ூ െ ߣ஺ߪூ஻ߪ஻ூ ൅ ߪூ஻ߪ஻஺ߪ஺ூ ൅ ߪூ஺ߪ஻ூߪ஺஻,  
 ߣூ ൌ 2 ப௣಺ப௫಺ ൅
பమ௣಺
ப௫಺మ
ݔூ െ ܿ′′஺ሺݔூሻ, 
 
 ߣ஻ ൌ 2 ப௣ಳப௫ಳ ൅
பమ௣ಳ
ப௫ಳమ
ݔ஻ െ ܿ′′஺ሺݔ஻ሻ, 
 
 ߣ஺ ൌ 2 ப௣ಲப௫ಲ ൅
பమ௣ಲ
ப௫ಲమ
ݔ஺ െ ܿ′′஻ሺݔ஺ሻ, 
 
 ߪூ஻ ൌ ப௣಺ப௫ಳ ൅
பమ௣಺
ப௫಺௫ಳ ݔூ,  
 ߪூ஺ ൌ ப௣಺ப௫ಲ ൅
பమ௣಺
ப௫಺௫ಲ ݔூ,  
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 ߪ஻ூ ൌ ப௣ಳப௫಺ ൅
பమ௣ಳ
ப௫಺௫ಳ ݔ஻,  
 ߪ஻஺ ൌ ப௣ಳப௫ಲ ൅
பమ௣ಳ
ப௫ಳ௫ಲ ݔ஻,  
 ߪ஺ூ ൌ ப௣ಲப௫಺ ൅
பమ௣ಲ
ப௫಺௫ಲ ݔ஺, and  
 ߪ஺஻ ൌ ப௣ಲப௫ಳ ൅
பమ௣ಲ
ப௫ಳ௫ಲ ݔ஺.  
Firm B must pay the following total license fee.  
 ݎݔ஻ ൅ ߨ஻ െ ߨ஺. If Firm B refuses to buy the license, in turn Firm A buys the license. The fixed fee is 
ߨ஻ െ ߨ஺. The payoff of Firm I is   ߮௘ ൌ ߨூ ൅ ݎݔ஻ ൅ ߨ஻ െ ߨ஺ ൌ ݌ூݔூ െ ܿ஺ሺݔூሻ ൅ ݌஻ݔ஻ െ ܿ஺ሺݔ஻ሻ െ ሺ݌஺ݔ஺ െ ܿ஻ሺݔ஺ሻሻ. The condition for maximization of ߮௘ with respect to ݎ is   
݀߮௘
݀ݎ ൌ ൬݌ூ ൅
∂݌ூ
∂ݔூ ݔூ െ ܿ′஺ሺݔூሻ ൅
∂݌஻
∂ݔூ ݔ஻ െ
∂݌஺
∂ݔூ ݔ஺൰
݀ݔூ
݀ݎ 																											 
  ൅ቀ݌஻ ൅ ப௣ಳப௫ಳ ݔ஻ െ ܿ′஺ሺݔ஻ሻ ൅
ப௣಺
ப௫ಳ ݔூ െ
ப௣ಲ
ப௫ಳ ݔ஺ቁ
ௗ௫ಳ
ௗ௥  
  െቀ݌஺ ൅ ப௣ಲப௫ಲ ݔ஺ െ ܿ′஻ሺݔ஺ሻ െ
ப௣಺
ப௫ಲ ݔூ െ
ப௣ಳ
ப௫ಲ ݔ஻ቁ
ௗ௫ಲ
ௗ௥  
  ൌ ቀப௣ಳப௫಺ ݔ஻ െ
ப௣ಲ
ப௫಺ ݔ஺ቁ
ௗ௫಺
ௗ௥ ൅ ቀݎ ൅
ப௣಺
ப௫ಳ ݔூ െ
ப௣ಲ
ப௫ಳ ݔ஺ቁ
ௗ௫ಳ
ௗ௥  
  ൅ቀப௣಺ப௫ಲ ݔூ ൅
ப௣ಳ
ப௫ಲ ݔ஻ቁ
ௗ௫ಲ
ௗ௥ ൌ 0. 
The optimal royalty rate for the innovator is expressed as  
 ̃ݎ ൌ െ ଵ೏ೣಳ
೏ೝ
ቂቀப௣ಳப௫಺ ݔ஻ െ
ப௣ಲ
ப௫಺ ݔ஺ቁ
ௗ௫಺
ௗ௥ ൅ ቀ
ப௣಺
ப௫ಳ ݔூ െ
ப௣ಲ
ப௫ಳ ݔ஺ቁ
ௗ௫ಳ
ௗ௥  
 ൅ቀப௣಺ப௫ಲ ݔூ ൅
ப௣ಳ
ப௫ಲ ݔ஻ቁ
ௗ௫ಲ
ௗ௥ ቃ. 
Denote the profit of Firm A in this case by ߨ஺௘.  
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